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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 A jury convicted Patrick Oar of the crimes of conspiracy to commit grand theft by 
extortion, and grand theft by extortion.  Mr. Oar asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his grand theft by extortion conviction1 because his actions did not “compel,” “induce,” 
or “cause” the victim to deliver money; rather, the victim delivered the money at the direction of 
a police detective.  Additionally, Mr. Oar asserts that his sentence is excessive in light of the 
mitigating factors that exist in his case. 
  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 M.D. was a methamphetamine dealer who worked her way up through a drug trafficking 
ring to the point that she was fronted thousands of dollars worth of methamphetamine, with the 
promise that she would pay her supplier back after she sold it.  (Tr., p.704, L.22 – p.713, L.12.)2  
In January of 2014, Detective Coy Bruner and other narcotics detectives arrested M.D. for her 
role in the drug trafficking ring; however, they held back filing the charges because she agreed to 
work with them as a confidential informant.  (Tr., p.325, L.4 – p.328, L.2; p.342, L.5 – p.359, 
L.11.)  With M.D.’s assistance, officers arrested Celio Ponce-Alba, who was known to M.D. as 
Omar (hereinafter Omar), after M.D. participated in a controlled buy where she gave Omar 
$6,000.00 in marked bills for methamphetamine he had previously supplied her.  (Tr., p.351, L.6 
– p.369, L.4.)  Omar was held in the Ada County jail where he was housed in a four-person cell;  
                                            
1 Mr. Oar does not challenge his conviction for conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion in 
this appeal. 
2 All citations to the transcripts in this brief will be to the 1220-page volume created for the bulk 
of the proceedings.   
 2 
Patrick Oar was arrested on a parole violation a month and one-half later and was housed in the 
same cell as Omar.  (Tr., p.237, L.2 – p.243, L.10; PSI, p.4.)3   
 Prior to his arrest, Mr. Oar had worked for local attorneys, including Dennis Sallaz, doing 
a variety of tasks including tracking down collateral and making collections.  (Tr., p.830, L.6 – 
p.833, L.22; PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Oar agreed to help Omar collect some debt that he was owed so that 
Omar could pay Mr. Sallaz a retainer.  (PSI, p.4.)  Mr. Oar recruited Katie Blake, a woman who 
he knew from her work at Mr. Sallaz’s law office, to help him collect some of that money.  
(Tr., p.380, L.8 – p.406, L.3; p.441, L.20 – p.446, L.10; p.882, L.2 – p.904, L.5; Exs. 8, 14-26.)   
Using the name “Pracilla,” Ms. Blake contacted M.D. at the Howard Johnson Hotel 
where M.D. worked the overnight shift, said that she was a friend of Omar’s and was trying to 
collect the $4,000.00 M.D. still owed him, and she gave M.D. a note written by Omar which 
included various payment options: M.D. agreed to pay the full amount but said she needed a few 
days to get the money together.  (Tr., p.718, L.21 – p.727, L.18.)  The next morning, M.D. 
contacted Detective Bruner and, at his direction and with his assistance, M.D. delivered 
$2,000.00 to Ms. Blake a few days later, while the transaction was being monitored and audio 
recorded by narcotics detectives.  (Tr., p.727, L.21 – p.735, L.5.)   
An Ada County grand jury issued an Indictment charging Mr. Oar in Count I with 
conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion, naming Ms. Blake as his co-conspirator, and in 
Count II Mr. Oar was charged with committing grand theft by extortion.  (R., pp.9-12.)  A few 
weeks later, an Information Part II was filed alleging that Mr. Oar was a persistent violator.  
(R., pp.29-30.)  Ms. Blake was similarly charged (although not alleged to be a persistent violator)  
                                            
3 Citations to the Presentence Investigation report and its attachments will include the page 
number associated with the electronic file containing those documents. 
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and the two were tried together.  (R., pp.13-15, 155-166, 168-184, 186-193.)  A jury found 
Mr. Oar guilty of both charges and he admitted to being a persistent violator.4  (R., p.241; 
Tr., p.1174, Ls.1-4, p.175, L.2 – p.1176, L.24.) 
The State asked the court to impose concurrent unified terms of 20 years, with five years 
fixed (Tr., p.1203, Ls.4-12), while Mr. Oar’s counsel requested that the Court impose a one-year 
fixed term, with an indeterminate term to run consecutively the term he was serving as a result of 
his parole violation (Tr., p.1213, Ls.6-15).  On each count, the district court imposed concurrent 
unified terms of 17 years, with five years fixed, to run consecutive to the sentence Mr. Oar was 
required to serve as a result of his parole violation.  (R., pp.1245-1249; Tr., p.1218, L.18 – 
p.1219, L.5.)  Mr. Oar filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.1251-1254.)      
 
 
                                            
4 The jury found Ms. Blake guilty of conspiring with Mr. Oar to commit grand theft by extortion 
but could not reach a verdict on the count alleging that she actually committed grand theft by 
extortion.  (Tr., p.1174, Ls.5-9.) 
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ISSUE 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion as there was 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in light of 




This Court Must Vacate Mr. Oar’s Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion As There Was 




 Under Idaho law, grand theft by extortion is committed when a person “compels or 
induced another to deliver such property to himself or to a third person … .”  I.C. §§ 18-
2403(2)(e); 18-2407(1)(a).  Although the elements instruction provided in this case did not use 
precisely the same language, the jury was instructed that, in order for Mr. Oar to be found guilty, 
they must find that he “along with Kathryn Blake, caused M.D. to deliver to Kathryn Blake US 
Currency.”  (R., p.216.)  Although there was evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Oar and 
Ms. Blake attempted to cause M.D. to deliver money to Ms. Blake, the undisputed evidence in 
this case demonstrates conclusively that it was Detective Bruner who compelled, induced, or 
caused M.D. to deliver the money.  As such, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict finding Mr. Oar guilty of grand theft by extortion. 
   
B. A Conviction Founded Upon Insufficient Evidence Violates A Defendant’s Right To Due 
Process Of Law And Must Be Vacated 
 
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State of Idaho 
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. 
Amd. XIV.  “Just as ‘Conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,’ 
so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt.”  
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional citations omitted).)  “It is axiomatic that a conviction upon 
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a charge not made or upon a charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process.”  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (citations omitted). 
The question of whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction can be 
raised for the first time on appeal.  State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995).  An appellate 
Court “will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution 
proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Severson, 147 
Idaho 694, 712 (2009) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)).  
When determining whether sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction was presented, an 
appellate court will not make determinations on the credibility of witnesses or how much weight 
should be given to each piece of evidence, and will view the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the State.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 
C. Compelling Or Inducing A Person To Turn Over Property Is A Necessary Element Of 
Grand Theft By Extortion Under Idaho Law 
 
 The Idaho legislature has instructed Idaho Courts on how the statutes it passes should be 
interpreted: 
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the 
legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. The 
literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent. 
 
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. Interpretations which would render the statute a 
nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are disfavored. 
 
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined in the 
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succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or definition. 
 
I.C. § 73-113; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-
893 (2011).  Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(e) reads in relevant part as follows: 
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's 
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in 
any of the following ways: 
 
(e) By extortion.  A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or 
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third 
person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, 
the actor or another will: 
 
1. Cause physical injury to some person in the future … 
 
I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e) (emphasis added).  By its plain language, where someone threatens another 
with future physical injury in they don’t deliver the demanded property, unless that threat 
actually compels or induces the threatened person to deliver the property, the person making the 
threat has not violated this statute.5 
 Although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar (with 
the assistance of Ms. Blake) threatened M.D. with future violence if she did not deliver money, it 
is undisputed that the threat did not compel or induce (I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e)) nor cause (J.I. 17 
(R., p.216)) M.D. to deliver the money to Ms. Blake.  Both M.D. and Detective Bruner testified 
that M.D. delivered the $2,000.00 in recorded bills to Ms. Blake at Detective Bruner’s direction.  
(Tr., p.432, L.6 – p.440, L.21; p.465, L.5 – p.473, L.17; p.730, L.3 – p.732, L.17.)  Put another 
                                            
5 That is not to say that a person making such a threat is free of potential criminal liability.  An 
attempt to compel another to deliver property by use of a threat of future physical violence 
constitutes attempted grand theft by extortion.  See I.C. § 18-306; see also State v. Reinoehl, 70 
Idaho 361 (1949) (holding that, under the then-existing statutory scheme, attempted extortion 
occurs where a victim delivers property to another based upon a motivation other than the threat 
made by the defendant). 
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way, Detective Bruner compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to deliver the money to Ms. Blake, 
not Mr. Oar.  As such, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar 
was guilty of grand theft by extortion, and this Court must vacate that conviction. 
  
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of The 
Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
 
Mr. Oar asserts that, given any view of the facts, his total unified sentence of 17 years, 
with five years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court 
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review 
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and 
the protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing 
the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Oar does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.   
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Oar must show that in light of the 
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id. (citing 
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 
121 Idaho 385 (1992)).  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility 
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 
(2001)). 
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 Mr. Oar admitted that he knew that he was trying to assist Omar in collecting a drug debt 
from M.D. and he recognized that he made a “terrible – terrible decision” in doing so.  (PSI, p.4.)  
He also took full responsibility expressing that he felt “‘very, very bad that Kathryn Blake has to 
deal with this’”, and that “‘she was doing what I asked her to do.’”  (PSI, p.11.)  Mr. Oar 
continued, 
“I have made a huge mistake, my actions not only resulted in the charges, but 
have also caused stress, pain and suffering for those involved.  I take full 
responsibility for my actions and the pain it has caused.  I hope the court will 
consider in my sentencing – that I have been a law-abiding citizen with no 
felonies for a long period of time, now over 21 years.  I know this situation nor 
anything like it will ever recur by me again.  I have in fact done over 15 years of 
intense close-custody parole supervision, and now I hope the court can see fit to 
put me back on parole as quickly as possible, or as it seems appropriate.” 
 
(PSI, pp.11-12.)  Finally, during the sentencing hearing, Mr. Oar again took responsibilities for 
his action, stating that he did not intend to scare M.D. and that he was sorry that Ms. Blake got 
caught up in it, and he apologized to the court.  (Tr., p.1215, Ls.1-9.)   
 In addition to taking responsibility for his actions, Mr. Oar enjoys the support of family 
and community members.  His half-brother Thomas Dishion, his aunt Elizabeth Cada, his 
cousins Fran Hardy and Dan Cada, former co-worker Thomas Henry, and attorneys Jacob 
Deaton, Ivar Longeteig, and Dennis Sallaz, all wrote letters in support of Mr. Oar.  (PSI, pp.84-
91, 381.)  These letters generally describe Mr. Oar as a reliable, caring, and hard-working 
person.  Id.  
 Idaho Courts recognize that remorse and acceptance of responsibility, as well as support 
from family members and friends, are mitigating factors that should be considered by the district 
court when determining an appropriate sentence.  See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982); see also State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).  In light of the mitigating 
factors that are present in this case, Mr. Oar asserts that the district court imposed an excessive 
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sentence.  As requested by his trial counsel, Mr. Oar asserts that a one-year fixed term with an 
appropriate indeterminate terms, to run consecutively to his previously imposed sentence, would 
appropriately address all of the relevant sentencing considerations. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Oar respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand theft by 
extortion, and to remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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